who will balance Israel’s right to self defence against the horrors we’re all looking at

I really hate this framing. Israel’s response has not been in Israel’s self interest. There is approximately 0% chance they will defeat Hamas, and approximately 100% chance they have hardended militant anti-Israel sentiment among Gazans for a generation. Further, they have alienated all of their potential regional allies (just as relations were starting to normalize), which is terrible for their long term security prospects in general; and their ability to resolve the Gaza problem in particular (since an ally that Gazan’s can trust would be incredibly useful).

Further, Hamas is not Israel’s biggest threat by far. They spent years planning an attack that only succeeded because of a massive failure on the part of the IDF; and only lasted for a day before the IDF completely steamrolled them.

As we can see know (and has been obvious from the beginning), Hezbolla in Lebanon is much greater military threat. Prior to the war, they were constrained by their rational self interest of avoiding a full war with Israel. In the beginning of the war, they made some pro-forma attacks, to which Israel offered some pro-forma responses; but things along the Israel Lebanon border were relatively quiet, because neither sude really wanted a war. However, as Israel continued its operation in Gaza, the political pressures in Lebanon grew, forcing an escallation of the conflict their. At this point, excluding the initial attack most of the damage to Israel has come not from Gaza, but Lebanon; and the IDF cannot just steamroll them.

And Israel is still in the “good case” of escalation. The elephant in the room here is Iran. As far as I can tell, Iran is not happy about this level of conflict, and is actively trying to avoid getting drawn in. However, it cannot simply abandon its proxies without massive loss of regional power. Nor can it be seen to abandon Gaza without significant internal political problems. The longer this war goes on, the greater the risk of Iran being fully dragged into it. If that happens, then everything up to this point will look like childs play. Israel will probably survive, but for the first time in decades, that will be brought into question.

None of this is new. This is the exact dynamic that was in play on October 6, when Israel’s actions were fully consistent with being aware of this dynamic. When October 7th happened, it did give Israel a bit more leeway to operate in Gaza; but that has always been limited, and has been long exhausted. Now, the dynamics are effectively the same as on October 6, but Israel is making the other decision of actively poking the bear of a regional war insted of simply tiptoeing around it as they had been doing. And Israel’s security suffers greatly for it.